Unravelling transmission trees of infectious diseases by combining genetic and epidemiological data by Ypma, Rolf J.F. et al.
Proc. R. Soc. B (2012) 279, 444–450
 on December 22, 2016http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from * Autho
Electron
10.1098
doi:10.1098/rspb.2011.0913
Published online 6 July 2011
Received
AcceptedUnravelling transmission trees of infectious
diseases by combining genetic and
epidemiological data
R. J. F. Ypma1,2,*, A. M. A. Bataille3,4, A. Stegeman3, G. Koch4,
J. Wallinga1,2 and W. M. van Ballegooijen1
1National Institute of Public Health and the Environment, Bilthoven, The Netherlands
2Julius Centre for Health Research and Primary Care, University Medical Centre, Utrecht, The Netherlands
3Department of Farm Animal Health, Faculty of Veterinary Medicine, Utrecht University,
Utrecht, The Netherlands
4Department of Virology, Central Veterinary Institute, Animal Sciences Group, Wageningen University
and Research Centre, Lelystad, The Netherlands
Knowledge on the transmission tree of an epidemic can provide valuable insights into disease dynamics.
The transmission tree can be reconstructed by analysing either detailed epidemiological data (e.g. contact
tracing) or, if sufficient genetic diversity accumulates over the course of the epidemic, genetic data of the
pathogen. We present a likelihood-based framework to integrate these two data types, estimating probabil-
ities of infection by taking weighted averages over the set of possible transmission trees. We test the
approach by applying it to temporal, geographical and genetic data on the 241 poultry farms infected
in an epidemic of avian influenza A (H7N7) in The Netherlands in 2003. We show that the combined
approach estimates the transmission tree with higher correctness and resolution than analyses based on
genetic or epidemiological data alone. Furthermore, the estimated tree reveals the relative infectiousness
of farms of different types and sizes.
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Estimating the transmission tree for an epidemic of an
infectious disease can provide valuable insights; it has
been used to evaluate the effectiveness of intervention
measures [1–4], to quantify superspreading [5], to ident-
ify mechanisms of transmission [6] and to study viral
evolutionary patterns [7,8].
Unfortunately, estimating the transmission tree is
rarely trivial. Generally, one needs detailed epidemiologi-
cal data, such as contact structures, while for many
epidemics only general statistics, such as case lists with
time of symptom onset, are known. Furthermore, data
are often missing for some cases. Luckily, another valuable
source of information, genetic data on the pathogen, is
becoming increasingly available. The amount of genetic
diversity observed between samples taken from different
cases informs us of the distance in the transmission tree
between these cases.
Estimates of the transmission tree will be best when
all available data are combined in one analysis; however,
methods to achieve this are still largely lacking [9].
One approach proposed by Cottam et al. [10] is to use
genetic data to exclude certain potential transmission
trees, and then evaluate the remaining possible treesr for correspondence (rolf.ypma@rivm.nl).
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16 June 2011 444with epidemiological data. Jombart et al. [11] followed a
similar approach, contrasting the construction of trans-
mission trees with the construction of phylogenetic trees.
We argue that a more consistent approach can be
obtained by combining both genetic and epidemiological
data in one likelihood function when reconstructing the
transmission tree. This likelihood function can then be
used in a Bayesian setting to sample from the space of
all transmission trees, allowing for the simultaneous esti-
mation of both the tree and the parameters of the function
itself. These parameters themselves can be used to
describe the dynamics of the epidemic. Such an approach
would be able to handle missing data, e.g. cases for which
no genetic data are known.
We develop the approach to obtain a more detailed
understanding of an epidemic of avian influenza A
(H7N7) in different types of poultry farms in The
Netherlands in 2003. This epidemic spread over a large
area and infected 241 farms and 89 humans in total,
with one human fatality [12–14], even though a movement
ban was promptly imposed on confirmation and both
infected and suspected farms were culled. The epidemic
also spread abroad, infecting eight farms in Belgium and
one in Germany. This specific H7N7 strain has not been
detected since, indicating the epidemic formed a dead
end for virus spread.
Using only epidemiological data, previous studies
showed there is a strong spatial component to spread
[15] and small hobby farms are less susceptible to infec-
tion than large commercial farms [16]. However, itThis journal is q 2011 The Royal Society
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or how farm size and type relate to infectiousness. Pre-
vious studies for other farm animal diseases such as
foot-and-mouth disease found a clear relation between
the number and type of animals on a farm and their infec-
tiousness [1,2,17]. We might expect similar differences in
infectiousness for avian influenza H7N7 as well, for
example, because the transport structures are different
for different farm types (e.g. food transports and egg
rearing) and the different host species react differently
to the virus. Here, we quantify the infectiousness of
farms of different types and sizes, using transmission
trees that we reconstructed from genetic, geographical
and temporal data.S3
Y
B
C
Figure 1. Examples of transmission trees. Circles denote
farms, full arrows denote estimated infections, dotted arrows
denote possible infections. Filled circles denote farms from
which no sequence data were available. (a) When all data
are available, the probability that B infected C is proportional
to the likelihood L(dBC) given in equation (2.1). (b) When
genetic data are missing for B, we can infer this by looking
at the sequence of the farm A that infected B. We then
assess the likelihood for the whole subtree: A infecting B,
infecting C. (c) When genetic data are missing for multiple
farms, we look at the subtrees containing those farms. Here,
two transmission trees are possible; B is infected by either A
or C. The likelihood that A infected B is proportional to the
likelihood of S1, while the likelihood that C infected B is
proportional to the product of the likelihoods of S2 and S3.2. METHODS
(a) Data
Influenza A (H7N7) virus was detected on a total of 241
farms in The Netherlands. These consisted of 205 commer-
cial chicken farms, 14 hobby farms (defined as flocks of less
than 300 animals), 19 turkey farms and three duck farms.
The nine farms infected abroad have not been included in
this analysis because virus sequences of these outbreaks,
exact location and/or date of infection were not known to
us and the farms are considered dead ends for this epidemic.
For all 241 farms, the geographical location and the date
of culling have been recorded. The date of infection has been
estimated using animal mortality data for all farms except for
hobby farms [18], for which we take the estimates from
Boender et al. [15]. Results in this paper were found to be
robust to small variations in infection dates. Data on the
number of animals kept were available for 220 farms. All
available data are provided in the electronic supplementary
material (although we are only allowed to specify the geo-
graphical location in terms of the closest town, owing to
privacy restrictions).
For 185 farms, the RNA consensus sequences of the
haemagglutinin, neuriminidase and polymerase PB2 genes
were determined from a pooled sample of five infected
animals [19] (GISAID accession numbers EPI_ISL_68268-
68352 and EPI_ISL_82373-82472). We will refer to these
farms as sequenced farms, and to the remaining 56 farms
as unsequenced farms.(b) Model
The first farm to be infected in the epidemic is taken as the
index case, infected by some unknown source; all other
farms are assumed to be infected by a previously infected
farm through an unknown route. We make the simplifying
assumption that all three types of data are independent
from each other, e.g. knowing the geographical distance
between a farm and the farm that infected it tells you nothing
about the genetic distance between the sequences sampled at
those farms or the time between infections of the two farms.
Figure 1a illustrates how the approach works. For every
farm B, we evaluate which of the previously infected farms
could have been the source. The likelihood L that a certain
farm A infected B increases if A is not yet culled when B is
infected, if A is located close to B, if the sequence taken
from farm A is similar to that taken at farm B, and if
no other viable candidates exist that could have infected
farm B. When genetic information is unavailable for one ofProc. R. Soc. B (2012)the farms, we look at the sequence of the farm that infected
this farm (figure 1b).
(c) Likelihood without missing data
When there is no missing data, the likelihood of a trans-
mission tree is simply the product of the likelihoods of the
links that it consists of. Therefore, we construct a likelihood
function L that gives the likelihood for our set of parameters
w ¼ (b,r0,a,p) and the event dAB that a certain farm A
infected another farm B, given our data D consisting of
temporal, geographical and genetic components, t, x and
RNA, respectively. This function consists of a product of
contributions given by the temporal, geographical and
genetic data:
LðdAB;wjDÞ ¼ LtðdAB; bjtA; tBÞLgeoðdAB; r0;ajxA;xBÞ
 LgenðdAB;pjRNAA;RNABÞ:
ð2:1Þ
(d) Time
We assume that farms are infectious starting 1 day after infec-
tion owing to a latent period [18,20,21], and remain equally
infectious until they are culled (a sensitivity analysis for the
length of the latent period can be found in the electronic sup-
plementary material). Date of infection and culling are
denoted by tinf and tcull, respectively. Owing to the decay of
contaminated particles, and the possibility of an infection
mechanism that introduces time lag, infectiousness drops
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the likelihood of the parameter b and farm A infecting
another farm B given their temporal data:
LtðdAB; bjtA; tBÞ ¼
0 tinfB ,¼ tinfA
1 tinfA , t
inf
B ,¼ tcullA :
ebðt
inf
B
tcull
A
Þ tinfB . t
cull
A
8><
>:
ð2:2Þ
(e) Geography
We assume that farms are more prone to infect farms close by
than far away, with the likelihood contribution of infecting a
farm a certain distance jxA2 xBj kilometres away given by
the best-fitting distance kernel taken from Boender et al. [15]:
LgeoðdAB; r0;ajxA;xBÞ ¼ 1
1þ ðkxA  xBk=r0Þa : ð2:3Þ
We performed the analysis with a wide range of differ-
ent shapes for this kernel, and found the results to be
robust to the specific choice of kernel (see the electronic
supplementary material).
(f ) Genetics
We assume the sequence sampled to be the most prevalent
sequence on the whole farm. Additional cloning exper-
iments performed by Bataille et al. [19] showed this to be
very probable for four out of five farms tested, where the
fifth was the first farm to be infected when the epidemic
spread to the south of the country, thus having an excep-
tionally long infectious period. We assume there is a fixed
number of nucleotides N that can mutate independently
of each other, and any mutations get fixed during or shortly
after infection. Since many mutations will drastically lower
the fitness of the virus, we set N at one-third of the total
number of nucleotides sequenced. We take pts and ptv to
be the expected number of transitions and transversions
per infection, respectively. We assume there is a fixed prob-
ability pdel of a deletion occurring during any infection.
Although such a deletion could decrease N, the length of
the deletions is small enough to ignore this effect. Let the
number of transitions and transversions needed to go from
the sequence of A to that of B be denoted as dts and dtv,
respectively, and let 1del be an indicator function: 1 if a del-
etion occurred, 0 if it did not. We then have for the
likelihood contribution:
LgenðdAB;pjRNAA;RNABÞ
¼ ð pts=NÞ
dts
ð1 ð pts=NÞÞdtsN
ð ptv=NÞdtv
ð1 ð ptv=NÞÞdtvN
p1deldel ð1 pdelÞ11del :
ð2:4Þ
(g) Likelihood with missing data
If all data were available for each farm, the likelihood of any
transmission tree would be the product of the likelihoods of
the links that it consists of. However, when data are missing
for a certain farm, we have to incorporate information on the
neighbouring farms in the tree to assess the likelihood.
Figure 1c illustrates this concept. To make it precise, let T
be the transmission tree to be evaluated. T consists of a set
of links, one for each of the farms except the index case.
Let i be a certain data type in the analysis, and let Si be the
largest partition of T into subsets, called subtrees, such that
for each farm that misses data type i all links connected to
that farm are in the same subtree. Then the likelihood of T
is the product over all data types i of the product of theProc. R. Soc. B (2012)likelihoods of each of the subtrees in Si:
LðT ;wjDÞ ¼ LtðT ; bjtT ÞLgeoðT ; r0;ajxT ÞLgenðT ;pjRNAT Þ
¼
Y
S[St
LtðS; bjtSÞ
Y
S[Sgeo
LgeoðS; r0;ajxSÞ
Y
S[Sgen
LgenðS;pjRNASÞ: ð2:5Þ
The likelihood of a subtree is again the product of the like-
lihoods of its links, where for each of the farms with missing
data, we sum over all possible data values. Note that if all
data of a certain type are known for all farms, which for
the epidemic of avian influenza is the case for both temporal
and geographical data, the subtrees for that data type are just
the individual links.
(h) Calculation
We construct a Monte Carlo Markov chain (MCMC) to
sample from the space of all possible transmission trees and
parameters w ¼ (b, r0, a, pts, ptv, pdel), using flat priors for
all parameters on the positive real numbers and for all trans-
mission links. Subtrees containing unsequenced farms, i.e.
farms without genetic data, are handled by summing over
all data values consistent with the least amount of mutations
needed to explain the subtree. Note that we do not have to
sum over all unsequenced farms: first, genetic data are irrele-
vant for farms that infect no other farms (Y in figure 1).
Second, farms that infect only one other farm (X in figure 1)
can be handled by extending (2.4) to allow for a farm
indirectly infecting another farm where there are x
transmissions in the chain:
LgenðdAB;pjRNAA;RNABÞ
¼ x
dtsðpts=NÞdts
ð1ðpts=NÞÞdtsxN
xdtvðptv=NÞdtv
ð1ðptv=NÞÞdtvxN
p1deldel ð1 pdelÞ11del :
ð2:6Þ
To correctly assess the likelihood of the parameters, we
have to normalize the likelihood functions, i.e. divide the
likelihood by the integral over the entire parameter range.
Since the geographical locations of the farms are fixed, we
normalize (2.3) for each farm by dividing by the total infect-
ing potential for that farm, i.e. the sum over all other farms of
the product of equations (2.2) and (2.3).
We take a burn-in of 500 000 iterations, checking for con-
vergence, and then sample 10 000 times, at every 500th
iteration. Averaging over the posterior density over the
space of trees gives the probability for each possible infection
event. We obtain a point estimate for parameters by taking
the median of their posterior densities and construct a 95%
credibility interval by taking 95% of the posterior probability
mass.
For each of the sampled trees, we can estimate the infec-
tiousness of each farm by dividing the number of infections
caused by this farm by the length of its infectious period.
Taking the average for each farm type gives us an estimate
of relative infectiousness of different types of farms.
(i) Evaluation of the estimated tree
To evaluate how much information is contained in the geo-
graphical and genetic data, respectively, we exclude the
geographical (2.3) or the genetic (2.4) likelihood from the
full likelihood function (2.1), re-run the analyses, and see
how much our results differ from the full picture obtained
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2. Infection events with posterior probability greater than 0.5. The analysis was run separately three times using
(a) temporal, genetic and geographical, (b) temporal and genetic or (c) temporal and geographical data. Red dots denote
infected farms, yellow dots denote farms not infected in the epidemic. A higher arrows opacity corresponds to a higher esti-
mated probability. The lack of arrows in (c) tells us geographical information alone is not enough to establish transmission
links. Although genetic information yields quite accurate results, we obtain more certainty for many links when also incorpor-
ating the geographical data. Furthermore, in the combined analysis, we can correctly show there was only one introduction into
the southern province of The Netherlands rather than multiple as suggested by the genetic data (indicated by the red arrows).
A magnified version of the northern part of the outbreak is given in the electronic supplementary material, figure S1.
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tree to look at are correctness and resolution; how close the
tree is to the actual transmission tree and how many links
can be established at or above a certain probability level,
respectively. Although correctness is the most important
one, it is also the hardest to measure. Resolution tells us
how well we can distinguish between potential source
farms; if our assumptions on the disease dynamics are
reasonable, an increased resolution should also be indicative
of an increased correctness.
To test whether the method correctly handles cases with
missing data, we analyse the position of the unsequenced
farms in the estimated transmission tree.0
0 0.2 0.4
probability level
0.6 0.8 1.0
Figure 3. Resolution of the estimated trees. For each level of
probability, the percentage of farms for which the farm that
infected it can be estimated at or above this level is plotted.
Estimates are based on temporal and (blue) genetic, (red)
geographical or (black) both data. Dashed and dotted lines
give the same information for sequenced and unsequenced
farms, respectively. The graph for genetic data (blue) is
much higher than that for the geographical data (red),
which shows the former yields more resolution than the
latter. This is confirmed by the fact that unsequenced
farms are hard to place accurately in the transmission tree,
resulting in a small surface under the dotted lines. However,
combination of all data types results in the highest resolution,
shown by the largest surface being under the black line.3. RESULTS
From our analysis, we obtain an estimate of the trans-
mission tree; for each pair of farms A and B, we get the
probability that A infected B. A graphical representation
of the estimated tree is given in figure 2a, which shows
the high-probability transmissions on a map of the
region. Figure 2b,c does the same for the trees obtained
when excluding geographical and genetic data, respect-
ively, from the analysis. The decrease in estimated
transmissions relative to figure 2a shows that combining
all data leads to an increase in resolution. An increase in
correctness is also shown: the combined approach
suggests only one introduction of the disease into the
southern part of the country (figure 2a), while the analysis
based on genetic data predicts multiple introductions
(figure 2b). However, additional cloning experiments
[19] have made clear that the disease was transmitted to
the south of the country only once and then spread locally.
The resolution of the estimated trees is depicted in
more detail in figure 3: it shows that more resolution
can be obtained when using the genetic than when
using the geographical data, but combining these gives
the highest resolution. Furthermore, the figure makes
clear that the 56 unsequenced farms cannot be placed
in the tree with high confidence.Proc. R. Soc. B (2012)There is a subtle point that can be made about the place-
ment of unsequenced farms in the estimated tree. That
is, if an unsequenced farm in reality infected another
farm that we did sequence, we would observe a relatively
large genetic distance between the farm that infected the
unsequenced farm and the farm that was infected by it.
Therefore, we would expect a sequenced farm that has
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Figure 4. Scatterplot illustrating the position of unsequenced
farms in the estimated tree. For each sequenced farm, we
plot the minimum of the genetic distances to the sequenced
farms infected earlier than this farm (horizontal axis) against
the probability it was infected by an unsequenced farm
(vertical axis). The small horizontal lines give the average
probability per distance, the large horizontal line gives the
fraction of unsequenced farms (equal to 0.23). The increas-
ing trend shows that the placement of unsequenced farms in
the estimated tree is more likely to be between farms whose
genetic distance is relatively large. This is probably owing
to large genetic distances being indicative of farms in the
actual transmission tree not being sequenced.
Table 1. Estimates of the parameters used, with 95%
credibility intervals (CI).
parameter
(units) interpretation
estimated value
(95% CI)
b (day21) rate of decline of
infectiousness
0.28 (0.23, 0.34)
r0 (km) scale parameter of
spatial kernel
2.4 (1.2, 3.7)
a shape parameter of
spatial kernel
2.3 (1.7, 2.8)
pts average number of
transitions
1.1 (0.88, 1.3)
ptv average number of
transversions
0.32 (0.22,0.43)
pdel probability of
deletion
0.069 (0.027,
0.13)
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infected by an unsequenced farm with higher probability,
although in general, we cannot identify which of the unse-
quenced farms were responsible. Indeed, in the estimated
tree, we see that sequenced farms that have a large genetic
distance to other farms are more likely to be infected by
an unsequenced farm (figure 4).
Table 1 gives our estimates of the parameters used to
describe the dynamics of the disease. The estimated
value of b ¼ 0.28 shows that infectiousness drops by
(12exp(20.28))100%  26% every day after culling.
This low decay rate could be partly owing to errors in
the estimation of the infection dates. The values of r0
and a give the infection pressure exerted by a farm to
farms a certain distance away, for example the pressure
exerted at 1 km is 24 times higher than that exerted at
10 km. The expected number of point mutations per
transmission is pts þ ptv  1.4, reflecting the high genetic
diversity found in this epidemic.
The transmission tree can be used to estimate the
infectiousness of the different types of farms involved in
the epidemic, and to look at the relation between farm
size and infectiousness (figure 5). We see that hobby
farms on average caused fewer, and turkey farms caused
more infections per day than chicken farms. This last
observation could be partly explained by the fact that
turkey farms were among the first to be infected when
the epidemic spread to the south of the country, where
the infections remained undetected for some time.
Although there is a relation between farm size and
infectiousness, it takes a peculiar form. It seems that
farms with fewer than 1000 animals (this includes all
hobby farms) are hardly infectious when compared withProc. R. Soc. B (2012)the larger farms, but above this boundary infectiousness
does not increase with size.4. DISCUSSION
We have estimated the transmission tree for an epidemic
of avian influenza by combining genetic, geographical
and temporal data using one likelihood function. We
have shown the increased correctness and resolution
obtained by using all data types in one analysis, illustrated
that the approach correctly handles missing data, and
estimated the infectiousness of farms of different types
and sizes.
The results we obtained on the epidemic of avian influ-
enza fit well into previous results. Bavinck et al. [16]
found hobby farms to be less susceptible, but lacked
the data to assess infectiousness, which we additionally
showed to be lower than that of other farms. The dichot-
omous relation we found between farm size and
infectiousness might be explained by large farms being
detected and culled before a substantial number of ani-
mals could get infected, or by a mechanism of spread
that is not very sensitive to the amount of infectious par-
ticles present in a farm. Boender et al. [15] used
epidemiological data on all poultry farms in The Nether-
lands to estimate the parameters of the distance kernel
(2.3). Even though they did not have any genetic infor-
mation available, their estimates of r0 and a, 1.9 (1.1,
2.9) and 2.1 (1.8, 2.4), are very close to our estimates,
2.4 (1.2, 3.7) and 2.3 (1.7, 2.8). The similarity of these
estimates, based on different datasets, increases our con-
fidence in both analyses. Further research on this H7N7
epidemic should focus on how the virus spread; knowl-
edge on which farm infected which coupled with
information on, for example, human movement and/or
historical wind direction could answer long-standing
questions on what mechanisms are responsible for the
spread of avian influenza. Furthermore, it will be interest-
ing to look at different predictors for infectiousness;
although we lacked the data to do so, it might be very
worthwhile to look at the impact of, for example, different
contact structures or trading practices.
In modelling evolutionary drift, the usual assumption
is that of a (relaxed) molecular clock, i.e. a constant
rate at which new mutations fix in the population.
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Figure 5. Estimated average infectiousness for (a) different types of farms and (b) number of animals on the farm, as measured
by number of infections caused divided by the time period in days between infection and culling of the farm. All farms to the
left of the dashed line in (b) are hobby farms by definition (these are farms with less than 300 animals). (a) We see hobby farms
are less infectious than other types of farms, while turkey farms are more infectious than chicken farms. This can possibly be
explained by the fact that many of the turkey farms in the epidemic were among the first to be infected when the disease spread
to the southern part of the country, where control measures were not yet in place. (b) There is a correlation between total
animals present on a farm and their infectiousness, however, the exact relationship remains unclear.
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ever, it is unclear whether this assumption holds on
short timescales such as the duration of one avian influ-
enza epidemic. We make the simplifying assumption
that mutations only fix in the viral population during or
shortly after infection, independent of time. The rationale
behind our assumption is that the infection of a farm con-
stitutes a population bottleneck for the virus. If infectious
periods are short, these bottlenecks are exactly where the
emergence of new dominant strains is to be expected,
even though the particular mutations could have been
present before the bottleneck. A more sophisticated evol-
utionary model that depends both on time and on
infection events would be highly desirable, and constructing
and fitting one will be a challenging improvement to the
analysis in this paper.
When using different types of data, a natural question
is how to ‘weigh’ these different types. We argue that the
most natural approach to weighing is by constructing
intuitively plausible likelihood functions for each of the
data types and then combining these in a straightforward
manner such as in our analysis. There is then a weighing
of data types implicitly done by the choice of function.
For example, the number of nucleotides that could
mutate, N in equation (2.4), is not known exactly;
increasing or decreasing this value puts more or less
weight on the genetic data, respectively. Plausible num-
bers for N range from the total number of nucleotides
seen to mutate (214) to the total number of nucleotides
sampled (5354). We found the results described in this
paper to be robust to changes in N for this range.
An alternative approach to estimating transmission
trees using genetic and epidemiological data that have
been suggested by Cottam et al. [10] is to assess the
data types sequentially; first, using genetic information
to exclude possible transmission trees, then assessing
the likelihood of these using epidemiological data. In
our terminology, this is equivalent to assigning each poss-
ible transmission tree a likelihood based solely on geneticProc. R. Soc. B (2012)data, and discarding the trees with likelihood values below
a certain level. Not only is this choice of level arbitrary,
but since the remaining trees are evaluated only using
epidemiological data, any further information in the like-
lihoods that were derived from the genetic data is lost.
A third approach was presented by Jombart et al. [11],
who nicely contrasted the construction of transmission
trees with the construction of phylogenetic trees, making
the link to the field of phylogeography. They, however,
only look at epidemiological data when genetic sequences
for multiple cases are identical, disregarding these data
otherwise. Furthermore, the method lacks a way to handle
missing data.
The general framework presented in this paper is
applicable in a wide range of settings. Although we have
looked at infections between farms, the same techniques
are also applicable when the infections are between indi-
vidual host organisms, such as humans, animals or
plants. Different types of epidemiological data such as
day of symptom onset, age or area code could be handled
by constructing an appropriate likelihood function, for
example, as in Wallinga & Teunis [4] and Mossong
et al. [22]. Furthermore, the ability to handle missing
data makes the method suitable for use in many practical
settings. Since the information contained in genetic data
increases with genetic diversity, the method is probably
more suitable to analyse epidemics of rapidly mutating
pathogens such as viruses; however, there are no theoreti-
cal objections that limit its application to epidemics of
other types of pathogens, which could be worthwhile if
much epidemiological data are available.
The framework presented in this paper reflects our
belief that all data gathered on an epidemic can provide
clues to what actually happened. How much information
each data type holds is usually hard to determine, but the
better we can extract this information, the clearer our
picture of the epidemic becomes. Ultimately, techniques
such as those presented here coupled with our increasing
capacity to build up large (genetic) datasets will allow for
450 R. J. F. Ypma et al. Unravelling transmission trees
 on December 22, 2016http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from the accurate and correct estimation of transmission trees
in a variety of settings, increasing our understanding of
disease dynamics. The real challenge then lies in not
only understanding these dynamics, but in also putting
this knowledge to use in our efforts to combat diseases.We would like to thank Annemarie Bouma, Gert-Jan
Boender, Thomas Hagenaars and Michiel van Boven for
critically reading an earlier version of this manuscript. We
would like to thank the Associate Editor and two
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